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standards have been rarely if ever made in this context, even 
though such standards are indeed meant to tackle the very 
problem of disparity (see e.g. recital 7 QD).
As for «legislative» practice, it suffices to note that the 
EU institutions themselves have treated the Dublin system 
and EU asylum standards as separable components of the 
CEAS. True, both are binding for the 26 EU States that 
fully participate in the CEAS (hereafter: CEAS States). 
How ever, international agreements have been passed with 
Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland (hereafter: 
 associate States)10, to the effect that these States participate 
in the Dublin system without being bound by the EU 
 Directives.
This state of «dissociation» is still the norm today. How-
ever, recent developments suggest that it might be, so to 
speak, an infant disease of EU asylum law.
De lege lata, the beginnings of an evolution are apparent 
in a handful of cases. Courts across Europe have started to 
discuss the permissibility of Dublin transfers by reference 
to compliance with EU standards in the responsible State.
De lege ferenda, the proposal to recast the Dublin Regu-
lation (Recast Proposal, RP)11, tabled by the Commission in 
December 2008 and commented on the pages of this review 
by Mathias Hermann12, might open up new perspectives for 
greater integration between Dublin and EU standards.
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1.	 Introduction
When the Dublin system1 was first established, it was not 
accompanied or preceded by harmonisation measures in 
the field of asylum. True, all Dublin States were (and are) 
parties to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees 
(CSR) and to human rights treaties such as the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). However, these 
international «common standards» were interpreted and 
applied in widely different manners throughout the Dublin 
area2. This «harmonisation-free» approach was of course 
deeply problematic. To restate a well-known argument: 
 unless and until a «level field of protection» is established 
among the Dublin States, the Dublin system operates as an 
«asylum lottery» for protection seekers3.
The problem persists to this day. As the EU institutions 
have acknowledged, the establishment of a «level field of 
protection» is still a long way off4. Some steps in the right 
direction have nonetheless been taken. To put it like recital 
5 of the Dublin Regulation (DR)5, «[the] implementation 
[of the 1990 Dublin Convention] has stimulated the process 
of harmonising asylum policy». Dublin is now part and 
parcel of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS), 
alongside with three Directives laying down minimum 
standards on: (a) the reception of asylum seekers (Recep-
tion Conditions Directive, RCD)6; (b) asylum procedures 
(Asylum Procedures Directives, APD)7; and (c) the criteria 
to qualify for refugee status or subsidiary protection, as well 
as the rights attached to these statuses of «international 
 protection» (Qualification Directive, QD)8.
As I have just noted, there is a clear normative link be-
tween these two components of the CEAS: «For the Dub-
lin system to function adequately, all Member States have to 
provide harmonised and adequate standards of protection 
for asylum-seekers»9.
This notwithstanding, until quite recently, positive legal 
links between responsibility-sharing under Dublin and 
harmonisation under the Directives have been virtually 
non-existent. Leaving aside the fact that the Dublin Regula-
tion itself makes no reference to the Directives, which were 
for the most part adopted later in time, the «dissociation» 
between the Dublin system and EU asylum standards has 
been apparent both in judicial and legislative practice.
In court, countless challenges have been mounted against 
Dublin transfers on the argument that protection and re-
ception standards were much lower in the responsible State 
than in the sending State. Quite naturally, these challenges 
have been framed and discussed in terms of compatibility 
with the principle of non-refoulement under international 
law. Perhaps less obviously, sustained references to EU 
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States were thereby absolved from their responsibility 
 under the Convention in relation to the field of activity 
covered by such attribution»18.
As a matter of international law, therefore, every State 
proposing to transfer an asylum seeker under the Dublin 
system must ensure that such removal does not result in 
direct or indirect refoulement.
It is true that, in discharging this duty, the sending State 
may rely on a presumption that all other Dublin States are 
«safe» for the applicant. To begin with, all Dublin States are 
parties to both the ECHR and the Geneva Convention, and 
the presumption is that they will respect their obligations 
under these instruments («interstate trust»: see recital 2 
DR)19. The risk of onward removal in breach of the ECHR 
is further mitigated by a second factor: since all Dublin 
States are subject to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR, the 
Court itself is (presumably) in a position to prevent onward 
expulsion in breach of the Convention20.
All these presumptions, however, have the sole effect of 
facilitating the task of the sending State – not of removing 
its duties and responsibilities. In fact, Dublin transfers are a 
special kind of «safe third country removals». Under inter-
national law, such removals require inter alia a «meaningful 
assessment» of whether the responsible State will extend to 
the asylum seeker «effective protection» against ill-treat-
ment and refoulement21.
3.	 	EU	standards	and	Dublin	transfers:		
emerging	approaches	in	the	case	law
It is worth pointing out that the duties recalled above flow 
from international law. Furthermore, the «meaningful as-
sessment» that the sending State must carry out focuses on 
The present article sets out and discusses these two evolu-
tions. Space precludes an exhaustive analysis – and a fortiori 
a full discussion of the intricate legal problems surrounding 
challenges to Dublin transfers. What is meant is, instead, a 
first analysis of the emerging orientations, of their legal 
 sustainability, and of their implications – including for as-
sociate States and for their «harmonisation-free» participa-
tion in the Dublin system.
Before turning to these matters, it is necessary to briefly 
recapitulate the role of international standards in the func-
tioning of the Dublin system.
2.	 	International	standards	and	Dublin	transfers
For our «recapitulation» we may take as a point of depar-
ture a minor event that occurred during the negotiations on 
the Recast Proposal. In the Recast Proposal, the Commis-
sion has included a rule granting semi-automatic suspensive 
effect to appeals against Dublin transfers13. A Member State 
delegation has objected that this would not be «justified by 
the principle of non-refoulement», and argued that «no ap-
peal should be granted» at all14.
Such a categorical claim would be justified if made in the 
context of a federal asylum system. In Switzerland, for in-
stance, asylum seekers are attributed to cantons, and such 
«attribution» decisions cannot by definition be challenged 
on non-refoulement grounds15. The fact is, however, that 
Dublin transfers in the CEAS are an entirely different matter.
To begin with, «attribution decisions» in Switzerland 
have no incidence on the outcome of the asylum claim, 
which is adjudicated by a federal authority under uniform 
federal law. Within the CEAS, by contrast, asylum claims 
are adjudicated by the Member States16 under (harmonised) 
national standards, and their outcome can de facto vary 
 dramatically depending on which State is responsible for 
them17.
In addition, and more to our point, Dublin transfers 
amount to the removal of asylum seekers between States, 
not within the jurisdiction of the same State. As such, they 
fall squarely within the scope of the non-refoulement prin-
ciple under international law. The European Court of 
 Human Rights (ECtHR) has made the point tersely:
«The […] indirect removal […] to an intermediary coun-
try, which is also a Contracting State, does not affect the 
responsibility of the [sending state] to ensure that the ap-
plicant is not, as a result of its decision to expel, exposed to 
treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Nor can 
the [sending State] rely automatically in that context on the 
arrangements made in the Dublin Convention concerning 
the attribution of responsibility between European coun-
tries for deciding asylum claims. Where States establish […] 
international agreements, to pursue co-operation in certain 
fields of activities, there may be implications for the protec-
tion of fundamental rights. It would be incompatible with 
the purpose and object of the Convention if Contracting 
 13 Hermann, op. cit., § 2.5.
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gees within the meaning of Article 1 of the Geneva Con-
vention».
Be that as it may, and conceding that the exact identifica-
tion of «interpretive» provisions in the Directives may be 
difficult in some cases, the point remains. The object and 
purpose of several EU standards is to lay down what we 
may call a «minimum binding interpretation» of the rele-
vant international standards – particularly, of everything 
that relates to non-refoulement. This is the conceptual basis 
for the two jurisprudential lines considered below.
3.1.2	 	EU	standards	as	a	basis	for	specific	safety	
	presumptions
In the case of K.R.S., the European Court of Human Rights 
had to deal with the familiar issue of whether a Dublin 
transfer to Greece would amount to refoulement under ar-
ticle 3 ECHR.
In dismissing the claim, the Court relied principally on 
two findings: (a) that de facto, Greece did not carry out 
 removals to the applicant’s country of origin, and (b) that 
the applicant could in any event prevent expulsion in breach 
of art. 3 ECHR from Greek territory, if need be by lodging 
an application with the Court itself.
Both arguments are quite problematic28, but they need 
not be discussed here. What matters for our purposes is that 
in rejecting the claim, the Court also noted the following:
«The Dublin Regulation, under which [the] removal 
would be effected, is one of a number of measures agreed in 
the field of asylum policy at the European level and must be 
considered alongside Member States’ additional obliga-
tions under [the Reception and Procedures Directives]. The 
presumption must be that Greece will abide by its obliga-
tions under those Directives»29.
To be sure, the Court’s decision provides no explanation 
as to how Greece’s presumptive abidance by the Directives 
might mitigate the risk of an article 3 violation. Some indica-
tions can nonetheless be gleaned from the way in which the 
Court summarises the Directives30. In doing so, the Court 
points out some of the guarantees enshrined in the Direc-
compliance with international law in the responsible 
State22. At first sight, therefore, EU standards do not and 
should not come into the picture.
Yet, as noted in the introduction, some courts are making 
sustained reference to EU standards in Dublin cases. On 
what grounds?
Broadly speaking, two approaches seem to be emerging. 
Under the first approach, EU standards are seen to be rel-
evant because they concretise the relevant international 
standards (see 3.1). The effect of this approach is poten-
tially double: consideration of EU standards may both fa-
cilitate Dublin transfers (3.1.2), or subject them to a more 
rigorous scrutiny (3.1.3). Under the second approach, EU 
standards are considered as relevant per se in assessing for 
the legality of Dublin transfers (see 3.2).
3.1  eU standards as a concretisation of the relevant 
 international standards
3.1.1	 Introductory	remarks
Several provisions of the EU Directives are meant to «add 
more detail»23 or, if one prefers, to «concretise»24 the rele-
vant international standards. Articles 6 to 10 of the Quali-
fication Directive provide the clearest example. By attribut-
ing a specific meaning to key terms such as «actors of 
persecution», «acts of persecution», or «reasons of persecu-
tion», these provisions purport to «guide the competent 
national bodies of Member States in the application of the 
Geneva Convention» (recital 16, QD).
Of course, not all the provisions of the EU asylum Di-
rectives have such an «interpretive» character. The EU Di-
rectives also lay down «autonomous» standards having no 
obvious counterparts in international law. Subsidiary 
 protection status provides an interesting illustration. The 
criteria to qualify for this form of protection are largely, 
though not exclusively, drawn from ECtHR case law (see 
recital 25 QD)25. By contrast, status rights are an entirely 
original creation of the European legislator, going well be-
yond the naked refoulement prohibitions derived from the 
ECHR26.
I should add that drawing a line between «interpretive» 
and «autonomous» EU standards may sometimes be diffi-
cult. One might query, for instance, what provisions (if 
any) of the Asylum Procedures Directive are meant to cod-
ify requirements flowing from the CSR. On the one hand, 
the CSR does not lay down explicit rules on status determi-
nation. On the other hand, respect for the non-refoulement 
principle presupposes «fair» procedures, respecting certain 
guarantees27. Did the EU legislator consider that some pro-
cedural standards are implied in the CSR, and if so which 
ones? In this specific case, recital 13 APD provides some 
guidance by enumerating a list of guarantees that the EU 
legislator regarded as necessary «in the interest of a correct 
recognition of those persons in need of protection as refu-
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exceed) obligations under the relevant international stand-
ards – which are, and remain, the central yardstick for as-
sessing the legality of removals. In this context, without 
going in too many details, it is worth quoting the remark 
made by UNHCR, that «[s]ome provisions in the first 
phase instruments, notably in the Qualification Directive 
and the Asylum Procedures Directive, do not or do not 
fully reflect international standards or may lead to breaches 
of international law»37.
3.1.3	 	EU	standards	as	binding	interpretation	for	the		
sending	State
Considering EU standards as a «concretisation» of interna-
tional standards is the conceptual basis, as we have just 
seen, for the following proposition: that, if binding on the 
responsible State, the Directives give rise to «human rights-
relevant» safety presumptions. From the same conceptual 
basis, however, one may also derive a reverse proposition: 
that a sending State, if bound by the EU Directives, cannot 
transfer an asylum seeker to a State whose practice is not in 
line with EU «interpretive» standards38.
Since the end of 2008, several German administrative 
courts have been suspending Dublin transfers to Greece 
precisely on this argument39.
tives, such as the «right to remain […] pending the examina-
tion of the asylum application», the right to «appropriate 
linguistic assistance and a personal interview», and the «right 
to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal».
It is submitted that the Court considered these specific 
guarantees as a concretisation of the general requirements 
flowing from articles 3 and 13 ECHR, e.g. a «meaningful 
assessment of the applicant’s claim», and «independent and 
rigorous scrutiny» on appeal31.
In this optic, the obligations of the responsible State un-
der the Directives become relevant because they establish a 
series of specific presumptions that «ECHR-relevant» 
rights and facilities will be afforded – e.g. that the asylum 
procedure will be carried out by qualified personnel and, 
where needed, with the help of an interpreter (see art. 4, 8, 
and 11(3) APD).
To confirm this point, it is worth noting that some na-
tional judges, in assessing the compatibility of Dublin 
transfers with the ECHR or CSR, have more or less explic-
itly adopted this line of reasoning32.
Could principled objections be raised against this pre-
sumptive argumentation? Not in my view. Indeed, presum-
ing that CEAS States will abide by the Directives is not 
different from presuming that State Parties will observe 
their obligations under the ECHR and CSR – a presump-
tion that is widely accepted33. And to the extent that EU 
standards accurately reflect and concretise the relevant in-
ternational standards, compliance with the former may 
well establish compliance with the latter.
There are nonetheless risks in the process – that is, risks 
that this sort of presumptive reasoning might be misused, 
to the effect of undermining the centrality and the integrity 
of international protection standards.
The first risk is that of deducing from the Directives pre-
sumptions that have no basis therein. The Directives are 
complex documents: they do establish a number of impor-
tant rights, but at the same time they allow for numerous 
and substantive qualifications and exceptions34. In reading 
the K.R.S. decision, for instance, one cannot dispel the im-
pression that the ECtHR failed to consider how weak the 
right to an «effective» remedy is under art. 39 APD.
K.R.S. also illustrates a second risk: excessive focus on the 
obligations flowing from the Directives, precluding careful 
consideration of the realities on the ground. The ECtHR 
recalls for instance the right to an interpreter under the Pro-
cedures Directive, but fails to consider the established fact 
that qualified interpreters are rarely available in Greek asy-
lum procedures35. True, presumptions are made to avoid a 
detailed analysis of the facts of each case. However, as point-
ed out by the Austrian Asylgerichtshof, the authorities of the 
sending State must be prepared to push their enquiry be-
yond formal obligations under the Directives, and indeed 
beyond their formal transposition in national law, to con-
sider the actual practice of the responsible State36.
There is a final risk to be mentioned: that of presuming 
too readily that obligations under EU standards meet (or 
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within a «range of permissible meanings» of the CSR. For 
its part, the House of Lords was firm in rejecting this «rela-
tivist» approach. It stressed that the CSR, and more gener-
ally human rights treaties, have in principle «one true mean-
ing». Such «true meaning» may be established by the 
authoritative case law of competent international bodies 
such as the ECtHR – and in this case, the authorities of the 
sending State must obviously have regard to this interpreta-
tion46. Failing authoritative international case law, as it is 
the case with the Geneva Convention, the authorities of the 
sending State «ultimately […] have no choice but to apply 
what they consider to be the autonomous meaning [of the 
relevant international standards]»47.
In other words, the House of Lords proscribed «double 
standards». If a State regards a certain interpretation of the 
relevant Conventions as impermissible for «internal pur-
poses», i.e. for the examination of asylum claims, it may not 
regard it as permissible for «external purposes», i.e. when 
assessing risks of refoulement in a destination State in view 
of removing asylum seekers there.
If this approach is correct, and if it is true that some EU 
standards lay down a binding interpretation of the relevant 
international standards, then the conclusion reached by the 
VG Düsseldorf follows quite naturally. A Member State 
that is bound by the Directives must necessarily regard 
noncompliance with EU «interpretive» standards in the 
destination State as noncompliance with the relevant inter-
national standards.
Before concluding on this point, it is important to stress 
(a) that under this approach, the main focus of enquiry re-
mains compliance with the relevant international standards, 
and (b) that it is not suggested that compliance with «inter-
The suspension decision rendered on 8 December 2009 by 
the Verwaltungsgericht (VG) Düsseldorf provides as good 
an illustration as any40. In essence, the VG proceeded in 
three moves. As a first thing, it considered the «safe third 
country» rule enshrined in art. 16(2) of the German Consti-
tution (GG), whereby EU states are all «normatively» 
deemed safe, and interim judicial protection against trans-
fers is in principle excluded. This rule, so the VG contend-
ed, is premised on respect for the CSR and ECHR in the 
destination State. Secondly, the VG noted that the obliga-
tions flowing from these Conventions have been «concre-
tised», so far as EU States are concerned, by the Directives 
on asylum. Based on these two considerations, it finally 
posited that an exception to the «safety presumption» un-
der art. 16 GG should be made – and interim suspension 
granted – when a third State or EU State, in spite of its ob-
ligations, does not guarantee at least in the essentials («im 
Kern») protection in line with the relevant European and 
international standards.
Some would argue that the first step of this reasoning is 
wrong as a matter of German Constitutional Law41. How-
ever, and this is what is significant for our purposes, the 
argument developed by VG Düsseldorf appears to be en-
tirely sustainable as a matter of international and EU Law.
The first point to recall is that, obviously, neither the 
CSR nor the ECHR require compliance with EU standards 
in the destination State as a precondition to safe third coun-
try removals. To this I would add that no explicit provision 
of EU Law lays down such a requirement: as far as safe 
third country removals are concerned, EU legislation only 
requires respect for international standards in the destina-
tion State42.
Yet, EU standards come into the picture insofar as (a) 
they concretise international standards («Kernanforderun-
gen des […] europäischen Rechts»)43 and (b) they are bind-
ing on the responsible State.
The first point was explained above (3.1.1). To under-
stand the second, we need to take a step back and reconsider 
the sending State’s duty to «meaningfully assess» compli-
ance with international standards in the responsible State.
In carrying out this assessment, obviously, the sending 
State must choose a certain interpretation of those interna-
tional standards – and the question is, which interpretation?
The point was considered in Adan and Aitseguer44. The 
facts are well known: the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (SSHD) sought to remove the applicants to 
Germany and France under the Dublin Convention. How-
ever, Germany and France interpreted article 1A CSR dif-
ferently than UK authorities: at the time, they both followed 
the so-called «accountability theory», whereas the UK ad-
hered to the so-called «protection theory»45. This diver-
gence was relevant to the situation of the applicants, who 
claimed to fear persecution at the hands of non-state actors.
The argument put forward by the SSHD to overcome 
this difficulty was that the interpretation followed by 
France and Germany, though different from its own, fell 
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Before any other considerations, it is worth pointing out 
that the judgment is by all means remarkable – in particular, 
it stands well above the average of Dublin cases for its care-
ful analysis of the conditions prevailing in the responsible 
State. One may query, however, whether the argumentation 
set out above does not take systematic interpretation too far.
To begin with, the Regulation’s preamble provides scant 
support for the strong proposition, made by the VG, that 
the Dublin Regulation intends to ensure access to an asy-
lum procedure «in conformity with the Directives». More-
over, the central contention that the Dublin system presup-
poses harmonisation does not sit well with the development 
and present state of EU asylum law. As noted in the intro-
duction, the Dublin Regulation was adopted without har-
monisation. One could perhaps disregard this circumstance 
in considering the evolution of the CEAS since. However, 
as also recalled in the introduction, Dublin membership ex-
tends today to associate States that are not bound by the EU 
Directives. In the absence of strong textual underpinnings 
in the Regulation, it is perhaps going too far to contend that 
the EU legislator intended to link together participation to 
the Dublin system and subjection to, or compliance with, 
EU standards as such.
In short, the argument of VG Frankfurt may seem to be 
overstretched in the present state of the law. This does not 
mean, of course, that it lacks merit as a normative argu-
ment. In and of itself, making Dublin transfers conditional 
on full compliance with EU standards in the responsible 
State would constitute an important step forward towards 
suppressing the «asylum lottery».
And, I should add, it would not threaten the centrality of 
international protection standards, unless one committed 
the fallacy of focussing on EU standards instead of interna-
tional standards. The judgment delivered by the VG Frank-
furt demonstrates, however, that this fallacy can be easily 
avoided. Indeed, the VG specifically points out that «seri-
ous violations of the [Directives] or of national and interna-
tional fundamental rights» are all apt to making a Dublin 
transfer illegal51.
3.3  The implications for associate states
The present position of associate States vis-à-vis EU stand-
ards can be summarised as follows. On the one hand, as 
recalled several times, associate States have no obligation 
whatsoever to implement EU asylum standards. On the 
pretive» EU standards in the responsible State necessarily 
means that the transfer is permissible. As noted above, EU 
standards are at present far from fully or adequately reflect-
ing international standards. Furthermore, and crucially, EU 
standards lay down a minimum binding interpretation. 
They preclude Member States from adopting a less favour-
able interpretation, for «internal» as well as for «external» 
purposes. By contrast, they leave to Member States all lati-
tude to adopt a more favourable interpretation. A sending 
State may therefore be satisfied that the responsible State 
respects EU standards, and at the same time consider that it 
does not respect the international standards on its own 
 interpretation.
The remark made by the VG Düsseldorf, that «Kern» 
European standards and international standards must be 
respected in the responsible State, is clear evidence that 
there is no necessary confusion on this point.
3.2  compliance with eU standards as an autonomous 
condition for Dublin transfers
In annulling Dublin transfers to Greece, other German ad-
ministrative courts have gone much further than the VG 
Düsseldorf. They have, in fact, posited that when the re-
sponsible State does not comply with EU standards as such, 
as opposed to «interpretive» or «Kern» standards, Dublin 
transfers are impermissible. Various argumentations have 
been deployed to sustain this position, but space precludes 
considering them all. As an illustration, I will set out the 
line of argument chosen by the VG Frankfurt in a judge-
ment of 8 July 200948, which is increasingly finding reso-
nance in German-speaking literature49.
The argumentation developed by the VG Frankfurt is 
centred on a systematic interpretation of the EU asylum 
acquis. The VG first considers the preamble of the Dublin 
Regulation, highlighting in particular recitals 4 (objective 
of guaranteeing access to status determination procedures), 
5 (progressive establishment of the CEAS, and role of the 
Dublin system in stimulating harmonisation), and 15 (ob-
jective of ensuring full respect for the Right to Asylum, as 
enshrined in art. 18 of the EU Charter). From these refer-
ences, the VG derives the proposition that the Dublin Reg-
ulation must be interpreted in light of the whole EU asylum 
acquis. More pointedly, the VG comes to the conclusion the 
Dublin system presupposes the existence of a CEAS as it has 
found expression in the Directives. In this perspective, the 
VG posits that Dublin transfers are acceptable insofar as 
asylum seekers’ rights are guaranteed in all Member States 
by virtue of the Directives (or, as expressed a few lines be-
low, that the Dublin Regulation guarantees access to an 
asylum procedure in accordance with the Directives). The 
implication is all too clear, and has been set out above: if the 
practice of the responsible State discloses (serious) breaches 
of the Directives50, then the sending State has no choice but 
to apply the sovereignty clause.
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4.	 	EU	standards	and	the	Dublin	system	under		
the	recast	Proposal
4.1  introductory remarks
In devising the successor to the Dublin Regulation, the 
Commission has steered well clear of revolutionary temp-
tations, adopting instead an avowedly incremental ap-
proach. The Recast Proposal, in fact, preserves the main 
features of the Dublin system as we know it today.
Nonetheless, the reforms proposed by the Commission 
are far from being insignificant. In comparison to the Dub-
lin Regulation, the Recast Proposal includes more generous 
rules on family reunification, as well as strengthened legal 
safeguards for asylum seekers. In an optic of burden-shar-
ing, it also includes the possibility to suspend transfers to 
States that are subject to particular pressures57. And, more 
to our point, it includes significant new linkages to EU har-
monisation measures.
On the one hand, it includes a number of new formal 
references to the EU Directives, which are disseminated 
throughout the Recast Proposal (4.2).
On the other hand, it includes a new mechanism for the 
suspension of transfers to Dublin States where the level of 
protection «is not in accordance with Community legisla-
tion» (4.3).
4.2  ensuring «consistency»: the Proposal’s references  
to eU standards
4.2.1	 	A	summary	typology	of	references
One of the stated objectives of the Recast Proposal is to 
«ensure consistency with developments in the EU asylum 
acquis, in particular with the Asylum Procedures Directive, 
other hand, the normative argument that Dublin should go 
hand in hand with harmonisation also applies to them, re-
gardless of their formal position. Indeed, several commen-
tators have pointed out, with different accents, the possibil-
ity, advisability, or necessity of «euro-compatible» asylum 
standards in the associate States52. The latter have, for their 
part, shown different sensitivities to the argument, from the 
fundamentally «euro-friendly» position of the Norwegian 
government53, to the uncharacteristic (and almost ostenta-
tious) neglect for EU standards displayed by the Swiss ad-
ministration in the latest reforms on asylum.54
None of the jurisprudential approaches examined above 
fundamentally alters the position of the associate States. 
Nonetheless, all of them open the perspective of a «two-
speed» Europe of Dublin, and some of them have the po-
tential to place additional pressure on associate States to 
align to EU standards.
The general thrust of the approach embodied in K.R.S. 
(«specific safety presumptions») is that obligations under 
EU standards facilitate Dublin transfers to CEAS States. 
This argument basically goes to the benefit of associate 
States, rather than generating pressure on them. In transfer-
ring an asylum seeker to a CEAS State, Swiss or Norwegian 
authorities could e.g. presume that access to health care will 
be provided in the terms of art. 15 RCD, regardless of 
whether they are themselves bound by this provision55.
Some problems could arise, by contrast, if the approach-
es followed by VG Düsseldorf and/or VG Frankfurt gained 
widespread acceptance among the authorities and courts of 
the CEAS States. In this scenario, the failure by associate 
States to meet some (or all) of the EU asylum standards 
would eventually hinder the transfer of asylum seekers 
from CEAS States to associate States. Such a situation could 
be problematic in several respects.
In the first place, being labelled as an «unsafe» country 
by a Dublin partner would be hardly acceptable for coun-
tries that have a long-standing humanitarian tradition, such 
as Switzerland and Norway56.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, associate States 
have a vested interest in keeping Dublin cooperation as 
smooth and problem-free as possible. If the CEAS States 
were to encounter systematic difficulties in transferring asy-
lum seekers to a particular associate State, the latter would 
probably face EU demands to «solve the problem» – i.e. to 
align its standards, so far as necessary, to European stand-
ards.
For the time being, this is of course a rather speculative 
scenario. The approaches advocated by the VG Düsseldorf 
and by the VG Frankfurt have not (yet?) gained widespread 
acceptance. Furthermore, there has been no difficulty that 
I am aware of in transferring asylum seekers to Denmark, 
Iceland, Norway, or Switzerland.
The trend is nonetheless set in that direction – a slowly 
increasing pressure in favor of euro-compatibility. And as 
we will see immediately, such pressure would rise steeply if 
the Recast Proposal was adopted in its present form.
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plicant under art. 9 RP, in a case where the applicant had a 
family member residing there by virtue of «provisional ad-
mission» status60? At the very least, applying the Recast 
Proposal to associate States would require a constant exer-
cise in «superposing» EU legal categories to the national 
legal categories of the associate States.
Provisions such as art. 18(2) and 3(3) RP would, for their 
part, raise problems of a different magnitude. On a literal 
reading, these provisions do require all Dublin States, re-
spectively, to examine protection claims «in accordance» 
with the Directives, or to apply safe third country rules 
«subject» to the Asylum Procedure Directive. Would that 
be their effect, including vis-à-vis the associate States?
On the pages of this review, Mathias Hermann has ex-
pressed doubts in this regard61. If I understand correctly his 
reasoning, his starting point is that the associate States could 
not in principle be subjected, through a unilateral act of the 
EU, to an obligation to apply the EU Directives. This would 
exceed the terms of the association to Dublin, and amount 
in fact to a unilateral modification of treaty obligations. A 
different conclusion, in his view, would only be justified to 
the extent that noncompliance with EU standards would 
undermine the functioning and principles of the Dublin sys-
tem. This, as he indeed notes, is a difficult criterion to apply 
– indeed many different positions are possible (see above 
3.1.3 and 3.2). Eventually, in discussing whether art. 3(3) RP 
could legitimately impose on the associate States the re-
quirement of respecting EU standards on safe third coun-
tries, he refrains from offering a definite conclusion.
For the reasons given below, I would fully agree with the 
contention that the situation is legally ambiguous. By con-
trast, I am not entirely won over by the reasons offered for it.
As a preliminary remark, I have reservations on the «uni-
lateral imposition» argument. Let us accept, for the sake of 
the argument, that an amendment to the Dublin Regulation 
had indeed the purpose and effect of binding all Dublin 
States to respect for EU standards. In my view, this could 
not be equated to a unilateral modification of the associa-
tion agreement. The reason is, simply, that Dublin associ-
ates have a choice62. They may accept the modification, and 
so agree to a modification of the agreement. But they may 
also reject it and seek an agreed solution in the Mixed Com-
mittee – or failing this, walk out of the association (see e.g. 
art. 4(7) DAA CH).
with the Qualification Directive, and with the [Reception 
Conditions Directive]»58.
This logic of consistency is pervasive, and it finds expres-
sion in many provisions having different legal significance.
First of all, the Proposal redefines the scope of the Dublin 
system by reference to the conceptual categories of the EU 
asylum acquis: instead of applying to applications for the 
recognition of refugee status under the CSR (see art. 1 and 
2(c) DR), the system would apply to applications for «inter-
national protection», including subsidiary protection, un-
der the Qualification Directive (see art. 1 and 2(b) RP).
Much in the same vein, the Proposal redefines the scope 
of some responsibility criteria on the basis of EU concepts. 
For instance, art. 9 RP provides for the reunification of the 
asylum seeker with his family members residing in a Mem-
ber State as «beneficiaries of international protection» (art. 
2(f) RP), rather then as «refugees» under the CSR (as cur-
rently provided by art. 7 DR.).
Finally, and beyond these «definitional» references, the 
Proposal includes a series of direct references to compliance 
with EU standards in the operation of the Dublin system.
The key example here is article 18(2) RP, which spells out 
the obligation of the responsible State to examine the asy-
lum application. In itself, the provision does not differ sig-
nificantly from art. 16(1b) DR59. However, art. 18(2) RP 
specifies that the examination must be conducted «within 
the meaning of article 2(d)». In its turn, art. 2(d) RP defines 
the «examination of an application» as an examination «in 
accordance with [the Procedures and Qualification Direc-
tives]». This is very different from art. 2(e) DR, which re-
fers to the examination of asylum applications «in accord-
ance with national law».
As a second, similar example one may take article 3(3) 
RP. Like the corresponding rule in force – art. 3(3) DR – 
this provision reserves the right of Member States to apply 
safe third country clauses. However, under the current pro-
vision, such clauses may be applied «pursuant to […] na-
tional laws». Under article 3(3) RP, by contrast, safe third 
country clauses would be applied «subject to the rules and 
safeguards laid down in [the Procedures Directive]».
4.2.2	 	The	implications	for	associate	States
From the perspective of the associate States, of course, all 
the provisions quoted above raise an uncomfortable ques-
tion: would they oblige them, albeit indirectly, to apply EU 
standards from which they have opted out (Denmark) or to 
which they had not originally committed (EFTA States)?
The problem is less pressing for what we have called the 
«definitional» references. In fact, one could hardly read 
into art. 1 and 2(c) RP an obligation to apply the Qualifica-
tion Directive. It is nonetheless the case that this kind of 
references would generate some applicative problems for 
(and in relation to) associate States. For instance: could a 
Member State ask Switzerland to «take charge» of an ap-
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art. 2 and 3 DAA CH). Or they may want to let the matter 
rest, and try to interpret away any obligations to apply EU 
standards at a later stage – of course, at their own peril.
Before turning to other matters, it is worth pointing out 
a rather straightforward implication of the provisions ex-
amined above, especially art. 2(d) RP. As we have just seen, 
it is unclear whether they would impose on the associate 
States an obligation to respect EU standards. Most certain-
ly, however, they would lend support to the argumentation 
developed by the VG Frankfurt in the judgment examined 
above (see above, 3.3). Whether obliged or not, associate 
States would therefore probably face increased pressure to 
adapt, for the sake of not hindering the smooth functioning 
of the Dublin system (see above, 3.4).
As we will see immediately, the establishment of the 
 suspension mechanism foreseen in article 31 RP would 
have the same effect, though on a different scale.
4.3  The «suspension mechanism» and «adequate» pro-
tection standards
4.3.1	 	Risks	and	opportunities	for	refugee	protection
If finally adopted, art. 31(2) and (3) RP would give the 
Commission the power to suspend Dublin transfers to a 
Member State where the level of protection «is not in ac-
cordance with Community legislation».
Several commentators, including UNHCR, have sup-
ported the establishment of this mechanism, arguing that it 
would provide an effective means to prevent removals to 
«dysfunctional or overstretched asylum systems»69. Others 
have been far less enthusiastic. In the article cited above, 
Mathias Hermann has expressed the concern that the new 
mechanism – by linking the permissibility of transfers to 
compliance «with Community legislation» – might obscure 
the obligation of individual Member States not to transfer 
an individual to a State where the CSR and ECHR are not 
respected70. Personally, I share both UNHCR’s support for 
the proposal, and the concern expressed by Mathias Her-
mann – though perhaps not as acutely as he does.
One could, of course, still query whether such a far-reach-
ing amendment would fall under the agreements – i.e. 
whether it would indeed constitute a «development» of the 
Dublin acquis that the associate States would be expected to 
accept (see e.g. art. 1(3) DAA CH). This is a potentially 
complex matter of treaty interpretation. Surely, such a de-
velopment would not correspond to the conception that 
e.g. Switzerland may have had of the association to Dublin 
– one which did not contemplate any «short-circuit» with 
harmonisation63. However, this conception has not found 
any clear expression in the association agreements, or in the 
declarations thereto. And the plain letter of the agreements 
stipulates that associate States shall accept and apply «the 
acts and measures […] amending […] the [Dublin Regula-
tion]» without exception. In other words, States such as 
Switzerland would surely have a point, politically, in ob-
jecting that harmonisation did not come originally in the 
«Dublin deal». They would nonetheless have a hard time in 
persuading their EU counterpart that amendments to Dub-
lin, indirectly imposing some measure of harmonisation, 
would not fall within the terms of the agreement. The Com-
mission, for one, made its views clear on this point. In the 
Recast Proposal, it plainly stated that «the associated coun-
tries shall accept the Dublin/Eurodac acquis and its devel-
opment without exception»64.
Arguably, therefore, a Dublin reform could well have the 
purpose and effect of tying up the participation in the sys-
tem with the observance of EU standards, and still be put to 
associate States as a «development» to accept or reject. The 
point that concerns us is another: would the Recast Pro-
posal have such purpose and effect?
As noted above, purely textual considerations suggest 
that it would: the literal meaning of provisions such as art. 
18(2) and 3(3) RP is that all «Member States», including the 
associate States (see e.g. art. 1(5) DAA CH), have to apply 
the EU standards referred to. The fact is, however, that nei-
ther the Recast Proposal nor its accompanying documents 
disclose a clear legislative intention in this sense – save per-
haps concerning art. 3(3) RP65. The impression one gets 
from these documents, rather, is that the Proposal has been 
drafted exclusively with the situation of the CEAS States in 
mind, without giving thought to the implications for the 
associate States66. This justifies, at least, a question: are the 
new references in art. 18(2) and 3(3) RP really intended to 
reaffirm (for CEAS States) and impose (for associate States) 
the obligation to apply the Directives in the operation of 
the Dublin system? Or are they, rather, a mere termino-
logical adjustment – the implementation of «rules on legis-
lative drafting»67?
This fundamental ambiguity is probably destined to lin-
ger on in the adopted text. The provisions that we have 
examined above have not been amended so far, neither by 
the European Parliament, nor during Council negotia-
tions68. Indeed, they have not given rise to any discussion. 
Associate States might want to seek clarification in the 
Mixed Committee before the adoption of the Proposal (see 
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5.	 	Concluding	remarks	and	outlook
All the developments that we have examined in this article 
disclose a trend towards closer integration between the 
Dublin system and EU asylum standards.
As I have argued, this trend holds both opportunities 
and risks for the protection of refugees in Europe. Under 
the first jurisprudential approach that we have examined, 
EU standards are seen as adding yet another layer of «safe-
ty» presumptions – one more. Still, if not handled improp-
erly e.g. through inaccurate deductions from the text of the 
Directives, the argument is acceptable in principle. Moreo-
ver, it could be seen as complementary to the other emerg-
ing approaches – under which compliance with (some or 
all) EU standards is considered as a minimum precondition 
for the legality of transfers. To be sure, risks are implied also 
in these approaches – e.g. the risk of «flattening» interna-
tional standards to EU standards, or of marginalizing them 
entirely. None of these methodological pitfalls is however 
unavoidable. In fact, the case law examined above demon-
strates that EU standards can acquire relevance without 
displacing international standards, while potentially intro-
ducing a measure of consistency in safety assessments – i.e. 
mitigating the «asylum lottery effect».
Quite apart from their merits and drawbacks, one might 
also say that all the developments commented above are, so 
to speak, natural: they reflect the trend towards establishing 
a Common European Asylum System – i.e. a construction 
whose elements are more closely and more coherently knit-
ted together than is the case today. The aspiration to achieve 
a higher degree of consistency is particularly visible 
throughout the Recast Proposal, which if approved in its 
present form would also introduce a centralised monitoring 
on compliance with EU standards throughout the Dublin 
area.
All these developments raise some challenges for the as-
sociate States.
The «harmonisation-free» form of association, which 
they currently enjoy, was conceived at a moment when no 
binding harmonisation of asylum law was yet in place. It 
rested on the idea that the common membership in the 
 Geneva and ECHR regimes would dispel any «disparity» 
problems. In this perspective, associating third states that 
are long-standing and respectable parties to the Conven-
tions, could well appear as a relatively unproblematic 
move72.
As the Greek case abundantly shows, the «suspension mech-
anism» would bring a valuable addition to the individualised 
responses of the Member States. At the same time, it is criti-
cally important to avoid sending the wrong message to the 
Member States – i.e. that the central «safety» standards are 
the EU standards, and that as long as the Commission does 
not take action, transfers may continue whatever the situa-
tion in the responsible Member State. For my part, I am not 
sure that art. 31 RP would generate confusion on this point. 
As we have seen above (3.2.) EU and international standards 
can coexist as autonomous criteria for the permissibility of 
Dublin transfers. Moreover, recital 17 RP evokes the «ex-
amination», by the courts of the sending State, «of the legal 
and factual situation in the Member State to which the ap-
plicant is transferred in order to ensure that international law 
is respected». Finally, recital 29 RP makes it clear that «with 
respect to the treatment of persons falling within the scope of 
this Regulation, Member States» would still be «bound by 
obligations under instruments of international law to which 
they are party». To dispel any residual risks of a misunder-
standing, perhaps, the continuing relevance of international 
standards, and the continuing (individual) responsibility of 
Member States to respect them, could be spelled out more 
explicitly in the preamble of the Regulation.
4.3.2	 The	implications	for	th	e	associate	States
In institutional terms, art. 31 RP would subject all the 
Member States to Commission supervision, and the legal 
criterion for this supervision would be compliance with EU 
standards. As recalled above, associate States are included 
in the concept of «Member States» for Dublin purposes (see 
e.g. art. 1(5) DAA CH). Therefore, they would also be sub-
ject to this form of oversight.
This may appear to be odd for States that are not bound 
by EU standards (ex hypothesi: above, 4.2.2). Yet, such an 
objection would not carry much weight.
The purpose of the procedure would not be to sanction 
noncompliance with an obligation. Rather, it would be to 
objectively assess whether the protection standards in a 
State are too low to allow for the transfer of asylum seekers 
there71. «Compliance with EU standards» would merely be 
the criterion set to the monitoring authority, i.e. to the 
Commission, and it would not necessarily presuppose or 
imply an obligation to respect EU standards on the part of 
the State subject to supervision.
What would this change, then, for associate States? As 
we have just stated, art. 31 RP would not in itself impose on 
them an obligation to respect EU standards. Nonetheless, 
it would significantly increase the pressure to adopt EU or 
«equivalent» standards. The reasoning is the same as that 
set out in section 3.3 above. But of course, the political sig-
nificance of a generalised suspension decreed by the Com-
mission would be incomparably greater than that of an 
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This was, however, a 1990s concept – which, admittedly, 
had its belated spring in the 2004 agreement with Switzer-
land. We are now in 2010. The transformation of Dublin 
into a constituent element of a Common European Asylum 
System, and the advances of this system towards greater 
internal consistency, might revoke the whole concept into 
question.
Already under existing law, the evolution of the case law 
described above might slowly increase the pressure to adapt 
to EU standards. The Recast Proposal, if adopted in its cur-
rent form, would determine a steep rise in pressure. On a 
strong reading, it might be seen to entail fully-fledged obli-
gations for all Dublin States to apply EU asylum standards 
in the treatment of persons subjected to the Dublin proce-
dure. On a weaker, perhaps more plausible reading, it 
would in any case make the adoption of EU standards a 
much more pressing issue than it is today.
This is not to say that the «harmonisation-free» model of 
association is threatened of swift extinction. In this article, 
I have merely described the beginnings of a story, which is 
still to be told for the most part. In the end, the case law 
approaches that I have examined might be of no conse-
quence for the associate States, and the Recast Proposal 
might be tailored to their needs.
Still, it would be worth considering the sustainability of 
a «harmonisation-free» association in a long-term perspec-
tive. Here is an excerpt from the Stockholm Programme73:
«It is crucial that individuals, regardless of the Member 
State in which their application for asylum is lodged, are 
offered an equivalent level of treatment as regards reception 
conditions, and the same level as regards procedural ar-
rangements and status determination. The objective should 
be that similar cases should be treated alike and result in the 
same outcome.»
If this objective came to be achieved within the EU, and 
if Dublin was part of the scheme as it surely must, it would 
become even more difficult than it is the case today to as-
sociate States that have no obligation whatsoever to make 
their asylum standards «equivalent».
But then again, the pragmatic would surely say «wait and 
see». After all, the road to the Common European Asylum 
System is paved with good intentions – and lofty statements 
unfulfilled.
